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When representatives of 22 developing nations walked out of the WTO’s Cancun 
meetings last fall, it was hard to imagine that much would come of the current (Doha) 
round of the agricultural negotiations.  However, the US and EU seem to have had 
second thoughts about the benefits of trade liberalization, and the 147 countries have 
been called back this week to try and forge principles for a new deal.  It is widely 
recognized that if the formula for further disciplining agricultural trade cannot be agreed 
before the end of July, then the process will drift into the new-year, after the US election 
and after the appointment of a new European Commissioner.   
 
Members, Canada included, have long since submitted their individual proposals on what 
their priorities for agriculture are, and on what shape they want any new Agreement on 
Agriculture to take. A number of  “consensus” proposals have also been tabled, 
attempting to bring these various individual proposals together into a framework within 
which Members might negotiate a final agreement. The task facing delegates in the next 
few weeks is to adopt one of these consensus frameworks, or to design an alternative 
framework that is specific enough to clearly lay out the road ahead, while still enabling 
Members’ disparate priorities to be realized. Assuming that this process is successful, 
Members will then be faced with a framework within which they will be able to negotiate 
specific numerical targets for a final Doha Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
What is already clear is that any framework for a new deal on agriculture that emerges 
this month will follow the same basic “three pillars” approach as the Uruguay Round 
agreement. Market access will be increased, export competition enhanced, and domestic 
support subjected to further disciplines. Canada’s agricultural sector does not generally 
benefit from particularly high tariff protection, from export subsidies, or from large 
domestic support payments, but must compete with foreign producers who do benefit 
from substantially greater protection and subsidies. At the same time, Canada’s agri-food 
sector is largely export-dependent and needs market access for growth.  
 
Canada’s approach throughout the negotiations has, therefore, been to push for 
significant further liberalization and the dismantling of trade barriers. At the same time, 
  1Canada’ dairy and poultry are trade sensitive industries.  The country’s negotiating 
position reflects this fact, arguing for flexibility in the implementation of market access 
commitments, retention of the right to provide certain domestic support programs, and 
the right to maintain a supply managed system of production and single desk selling.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the main consensus proposals being considered by 
Members in Geneva with respect to how they meet Canada’s stated priorities, and to 
move toward defining an optimal outcome for this country’s agricultural sector. 
 
 
2.0 Current  Proposals. 
 
There are currently four main consensus proposals under consideration, referred to as the 
Harbinson Proposal, the EU-US Joint Framework, the Perez del Castillo Annex and the 
Derbez Text. The first of these proposals, drafted in early 2003 by the Chair of the 
agriculture negotiations, Stuart Harbinson, proposes both a method for defining further 
disciplines and numerical targets. The three subsequent proposals put forward a 
framework, or method, but no specific numerical targets. Furthermore the three later 
proposals all adopt a similar method to one another, but one quite different to that 
proposed by Harbinson.  There thus emerge two basic models for consideration, one 
proposed by Harbinson, the other proposed by the EU and US and supported by Perez del 
Castillo and Luis Derbez. 
 
All of the models contain provisions for improving market access, reducing export 
subsidies, and reducing domestic subsidies to farmers.  Provisions of each on these three 
elements are outlined below.   
 




•  Tariffs. Harbinson proposes a modified version of the Uruguay Round formula (a 
simple average reduction with a minimum reduction per product) whereby the 
Uruguay Round approach would be used but would be applied in bands, with 
steeper cuts at higher levels.  Tariffs in the highest band (those over 90%) would 
face average reductions of 60% over five years, in equal installments, with a 
minimum reduction of 45% on each tariff line. Those in the lowest band (below 
15%) would face an average reduction of 40% and a minimum per tariff line 
reduction of 25%. Those in the middle band would face an average reduction of 
50% and a minimum reduction of 35%. 
•  Tariff Escalation. Tariffs on processed products that are higher than those for the 
product in its primary form would be subject to a rate of reduction equivalent to 
that for the primary product multiplied, at a minimum, by 1.3. 
•  TRQ's.  Tariff rate quota volumes would be increased to 10% of current (1999-
2001) domestic consumption over five years. The draft also proposes measures to 
increase the transparency and fairness of TRQ administration and allocation. 
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Export Competition 
 
•  Export subsidies. Harbinson proposes reducing the value of subsidies and the 
quantity of goods eligible to receive them to zero over nine years, with 50% of 
these goods having their export subsidies eliminated within the first five years.  
•  Export Credits. Export credits, credit guarantees and insurance programs should 




•  Green Box. Retain the Green Box (i.e. the list of policy instruments that 
governments may use without fear of trade action) but define more precisely what 
programs qualify. 
•  Blue Box. Cap and bind Blue Box (i.e. special accommodations for US and EU 
programs) supports at the most recently notified level and then reduce them by 
50% over five years. Remaining Blue Box payments to be included in a 
Member’s Current Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) limit.  
•  Amber Box. The Amber Box contains those policy instruments that can be used 
only with limitations, as defined by the 1995 WTO. Harbinson proposes limiting 
expenditures on total AMS by 60% over five years. Furthermore, he proposes 
amending Article 6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture to ensure that the AMS for 
individual products (rather than total AMS) does not exceed the respective 
average levels of such support provided over the period 1999-2001 (rather than 
Uruguay Round bound levels). 
•  De minimis. Reducing the 5% exemption provided for in Article 6.4 (a) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture by 0.5% per year for five years.  
 
 




•  Tariffs. The EU-US joint proposal advocates a ‘blended approach’, whereby 
tariffs on some products would be reduced as per the Uruguay Round formula, 
tariffs on some products would be reduced via the Swiss Formula
1 and for other 
products, tariffs would be eliminated altogether. The proposal does not state what 
percentage of tariff lines would be disciplined by each formula, what the 
                                                 
Swiss Formula: A harmonizing formula, intended to significantly narrow the gap between high and 
low tariffs. A key feature is the Swiss Formula “coefficient”, which determines the maximum final 
tariff rate. The Formula is Z = AX/(A+X), where X is the initial tariff, A is the coefficient, and Z is the 
final, reduced tariff. The Swiss formula with a coefficient of 25 (as proposed by the US) would reduce 
tariffs of 150%, 75% and 10% to 21.4%, 16.7% and 7.6%. The UR formula with an average reduction 




  3percentage reductions would be, or what the Swiss Formula coefficient would be. 
It does state though that tariffs that exceed some maximum would either be 
reduced to that maximum level, or would see their TRQ volumes increased.  
 
The Perez del Castillo and Derbez proposals mirror the EU-US proposal in this 
area, with the exception that the Derbez text, in addition, proposes that the simple 
average of the tariff reductions realized under the blended approach should not be 
less than some set (but unspecified) percentage. Derbez also carries forward the 
Harbinson proposal that tariff escalation be addressed by applying some 
multiplicative factor to the tariff reduction of processed products in cases where 
that product’s tariff is higher than the tariff for the product in its primary form. 
•  Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ’s). The Derbez Text proposes a percentage reduction 
in in-quota tariffs and notes that the terms and conditions of any TRQ expansion 




•  Export subsidies. All three proposals call for the elimination of export subsidies 
for a specified (but yet to be determined) list of products of particular interest to 
developing countries and reductions for other products. Perez del Castillo and 
Derbez also propose that Members negotiate a date by which all export subsidies 
be eliminated. 
•  Export Credits. Eliminate and reduce in parallel with export subsidies.  
•  Other. Disciplines on food aid are also proposed, as are disciplines on single desk 




•  Green Box. All three EU-US Model proposals agree that Green Box criteria need 
to be reviewed, but then leave this area for future negotiation. 
•  Blue Box. The Blue Box should be redefined, capped and reduced such that 
payments do not exceed 5% of the total value of (2000-02) production by the end 
of the implementation period. Perez del Castillo and Derbez propose, in addition, 
that Blue Box payments be subsequently reduced further by a set percentage over 
a number of years. Derbez also calls for a substantial reduction, or down payment, 
in year one. 
•  Amber Box. All three proposals call for a reduction in AMS, but no specific 
numbers are given. Derbez proposes a substantial down payment in year one. 
•  De minimis. Reduce the de minimis level of exemptions. Derbez proposes a 
substantial down-payment in year one 
•  Other.  The EU and US propose reducing total domestic support (de minimis, 
AMS and the redefined Blue Box) to a level that is lower than the 2004 level. 
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3.0  Implications for Canada 
 
For Canada’s export oriented industries, each of the proposals has different implications: 
•  The Harbinson proposal would probably provide the least market access for 
Canadian exporters: the banded approach to tariff reductions would reduce them 
less than the blended approach of the US/EU et al proposals (with its 
incorporation of the Swiss formula).  
•  Also, the nine-year phase out period for export subsidies is longer than many 
would like. All of the proposals, however, call for the eventual complete 
elimination of export subsidies.  This should be welcomed by the export-oriented 
industries, and the faster other countries eliminate them, the better.  
•  At the same time, the banded Harbinson approach does attempt to harmonize 
tariffs, and the reductions it prescribes for tariff lines in the highest band are 
significantly more ambitious than those seen in the Uruguay Round.  
•  The Harbinson model proposes doubling TRQ volumes and addressing tariff 
escalation, both important concerns for Canadian exporters.  
•  The proposal to impose a maximum tariff (or tariff ceiling) will also be attractive, 
as will the idea of a minimum simple average reduction across all tariff lines and 
the inclusion of a tariff escalation formula.  The latter is particularly important 
because it will provide incentives to move away from commodity production 
toward value added production – something that is often difficult under current 
tariff schedules since tariffs tend to be exorbitantly high on end use products and 
low on raw products. 
•  All the proposals recommend a reduction in the AMS, but Harbinson recommends 
reducing it by 60%, while the others are less specific and less aggressive.  Given 
Canada’s lower subsidy rate and the effect on world commodity prices of EU and 
US producer subsidy equivalents of over 25%, Canadian exporters should be 
pleased with the certainty of a large reduction in domestic subsidies. 
•  The US-EU continuing reference to further disciplining single desk sellers 
(including price pooling) will be a flag for many in the Canadian industry. It 




For Canada’s import sensitive sectors, some of the considerations are the opposite, but 
some are the same:  
•  Harbinson would bring tariffs down by less since he does not propose using the 
Swiss Formula. 
•  However Harbinson would require a minimum per product tariff reduction of 
45% on tariffs over 90%.  This would substantially reduce Canada’s protection 
for dairy and poultry. 
•  The notion of flexibility in terms of lower tariff reductions on sensitive products 
proposed in the EU-US model will be important to the dairy and poultry 
industries. 
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of AMS.  It will at least be some consolation that if Canada loses part of its 
protection for dairy and poultry that, at least, there will be a limit on the subsidies 
received by its competitors.  
•  As with the export oriented industries, the dairy and poultry industries will likely 
applaud the fact that both models call for reductions and eventual elimination of 
export subsidies. One caveat is that, given the recent WTO ruling that Canadian 
dairy exports receive actionable export subsidies by virtue of the higher domestic 
prices enabled by the supply management system, the dairy industry may be less 
supportive than others.  Canada has agreed, in response to the WTO ruling, to 
reduce its dairy exports to a level that brings the subsidy to within Canada’s WTO 
export subsidy commitments. If this export subsidy limit is reduced or eliminated, 
dairy exports under the current supply management regime will also need to be 




4.0  What’s Likely to Happen?  
 
The single most significant aspect of this report and, therefore, of the current negotiation, 
is that the US and EU have come forward with a position that can result in significant 
progress in reducing trade barriers in agriculture. While there remains some vagueness to 
the proposals because of the lack of numbers, it is clear that their proposal will bring 
significantly more market access than the previous EU proposal to, essentially, allow the 
continuance of the Uruguay Round process.  The EU’s subsequent offer to put the 
elimination of export subsidies on the table further supports this contention. 
 
None of the proposals go anywhere near yielding complete free trade, so protectionists 
will have solace.  But all of them go far enough that an outcome should result that 
reduces protection and subsidies enough to cause discomfort for those who are protected 
(the EU is backing change, but we’ve still to hear from German and French farm 
organizations.)  Most importantly, it would appear that the proposals go far enough to 
provide opportunities to developing countries whose farmers need them in order to hope 
to become developed countries.  
 
Here are our thoughts on what’s likely in each of the main areas. 
 
4.1 Market  Access 
 
Our expectation is that some form of blended formula approach to tariff reduction will be 
adopted as the basis for any final Agreement on Agriculture.  This approach will allow 
Members to realize the maximum possible level of tariff reduction on the majority of 
products, while still meeting the needs of import-sensitive industries for more gradual 
transitions.  Canada will try to negotiate the inclusion of enough tariff lines in the 
Uruguay Round formula category to accommodate Canada’s key interests, and to 
negotiate percentage tariff reductions within this category that do not create major threats 
  6to supply management.  Also, the concept of blending a mixture of tariff reductions and 
TRQ expansion where industries find it more appropriate.  Canada will also want to 
continue to advocate for sectoral, or ‘zero for zero’ negotiations, whereby those parties 
interested in liberalization beyond the scope of any general agreement can pursue such 
goals on a sector by sector basis.  
 
In addition, in order to accommodate the very real concerns of those developing countries 
who rely on high tariffs to counter developed country subsidies, some kind of alternative 
tariff reduction formula may need to be negotiated for developing countries that 
minimizes the use of the Swiss formula, or which applies a significantly lower 
coefficient. India and Brazil, in particular, are unlikely to sign any deal that fails to reflect 
this concern. The G-20 has formally rejected the use of the blended approach, but has not 
yet proposed an alternative framework of its own. 
 
We expect that any final agreement will require Members to fulfill their existing 
commitments with respect to TRQ volumes and that in-quota tariffs will be reduced to 
zero, and we urge Canada’s negotiators to press for both of these outcomes. TRQ volume 
increases will clearly be a more sensitive issue, however.  
 
4.2  Export Competition  
 
We expect that export subsidies will be reduced and that a date for their eventual 
elimination will be agreed. We expect that the subsidy elements of export credits and 
other export promotion programs will be similarly disciplined. We urge Canada’s 
representatives to push hard for this outcome.  
 
It would appear that there is little support for special treatment of state trading entities.  
Our position on the effect of the Canadian Wheat Board on value adding in Western 
Canada was well documented in a report for the Government of Alberta two years ago.  
However, politically, we believe Western Canadian farmers should have the right to 
choose (in a fairly worded referendum) and that state trading entities and comparable 
private sector entities should be held to the same business disciplines. 
 
4.3 Domestic  Support 
 
We expect that the definition of Green Box programs will be clarified and urge Canada’s 
representatives to continue supporting such a move. In addition, we support the proposal 
to establish a mechanism within the WTO whereby new programs can be assessed for 
their compatibility with the Green Box prior to their introduction. This will save a huge 
amount of uncertainty and dislocation that results from countervail cases against policies 
genuinely considered by the implementing government to have been within their WTO 
commitments.   
 
We expect that the Blue Box will be retained in its current form and will be subject to a 
cap and a schedule of reductions. We further expect that any remaining Blue Box 
  7supports will, after some date, be included in the calculation of Members’ Total AMS. 
We support each of these developments. 
 
We expect that Total AMS will be significantly reduced, but not reduced to zero. We also 
expect to see a reduction in the de minimis level of exemptions.  
 
The Peace Clause, under which subsidies provided in accordance with the Agreement on 
Agriculture are non-actionable even if they violate general WTO rules, lapsed at the end 
of 2003. Proposals currently under consideration include extending the Peace Clause 
wholesale, extending it just for Green Box measures, and not extending it at all. We 
expect there to be strong pressure to retain the Peace Clause, but would urge Canada’s 
representatives to resist this pressure, and to continue arguing for the maintenance of the 
Peace Clause for Green Box programs only.  
 
 
5.0 Summary   
 
In summary, it is clear that there is a general movement among Members towards some 
kind of flexible blended approach to market access, substantial reductions in domestic 
subsidies and a move toward ending export subsidies.  These have been goals of both 
Canadian and developing country policies for many years, and it appears there is a finally 
a chance that progress will be made.  At the same time, the rules appear to leave enough 
scope for countries to have enough sovereignty to provide a limited amount of protection 
and assistance for their sensitive products.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the will really exists to make the deal, and then to see 
whether countries, especially the US and EU, have the will to live by their commitments. 
The first will be tested over the next few weeks because it is widely believed that if an 
agreement in principle is not reached by the end of July, then nothing will occur for at 
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